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ABSTRACT
Using data on trust and trustworthiness from the 1990 wave of the World Values Survey, I
first investigate a model of the extent of tax cheating and the size of government that recognizes the
interdependence of the two.  The results reveal that tax cheating is lower in countries that exhibit
more (not-government-related) trustworthiness.  However, holding that constant, tax cheating
becomes more acceptable as government grows.  All in all, there is some weak evidence that the
strong positive cross-country correlation between the size of government and tax cheating masks
the fact that big government induces tax cheating while, at the same time, tax cheating constrains
big government.  
I then add to the structural model an equation determining the level of prosperity, allowing
prosperity to depend, inter alia, on the level of government and on trust in others.  I find some
evidence that both prosperity and government involvement are higher in more trusting societies.
Moreover, holding these measures of trust constant, the association of government size with
prosperity is positive until a level of government spending somewhere between 31% and 38% of
GDP, after which its marginal effect is negative.  Thus, although a trusting citizenry allows larger

















"Although good economic analysis calls for joint consideration of both [the expenditure 
and revenue sides], the practice is to deal with them as more or less separate issues." 
Musgrave and Musgrave (5th ed., p. 11) 
 
"Some people are happy that there are externalities everywhere, and others would prefer 
that there be none at all." [paraphrased] 
Richard Musgrave, on the occasion of receiving the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws 
from the University of Michigan, December 15, 1991. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
  With a few exceptions, the positive and normative analysis of taxation has 
proceeded as if the purposes for which the funds are being raised and the efficiency if 
which they are utilized are irrelevant. As the first statement above makes clear, Richard 
(and, in this case, Peggy) Musgrave lamented this dichotomy.
1 He argued that analytical 
blinders blurred important questions such as the net distributional impact of government 
and prevented fruitful discussion of policies such as the earmarking of revenues.  
Throughout his career Professor Musgrave also took seriously the vital role government 
can play in an economy and a society, including but not limited to achieving an 
appropriate allocation of resources in the presence of externalities.  In the second 
statement quoted above, he recognizes that not all people enjoy the interaction among 
people—the sense of community--that the presence of externalities compels.   But clearly 
he himself does.  He writes:  "I think of the state as an association of individuals, engaged 
in a cooperative venture, formed to resolve problems of social coexistence and do so in a 
democratic and fair manner.  And also:  "Overrepresented in my German and 
                                                           
1 Note that I am speaking here of why public finance theorists treat expenditures and taxation separately, 
and not about why in practice expenditure programs are not tied to particular tax instruments, the practice 
known as earmarking.  Opponents of earmarking argue that it leads to a fragmented and inefficient tax 
system, and that tying expenditure amounts to specified tax revenues causes inefficient resource allocation 
decisions.     2
underrepresented in my U.S. years, I am well aware that the concept of community is 
subject to abuse...At the same time, the concept of community should not be exorcised 
for that reason." (Buchanan and Musgrave 1999, pp. 31, 33)  
  In this essay I argue that the idea of community, fostered by trust among citizens 
and perhaps also by trust in government, ties together these two lifelong concerns of 
Professor Musgrave.  Moreover, consideration of these issues may shed light on some 
important public finance issues, including whether taxpayers' evaluations of government 
expenditures or the fairness of the tax system affect their willingness to comply with the 
tax law, and whether variations in trust are an important factor in explaining the cross-
country patterns in levels of taxation and the type of taxes used.
2 
In what follows I first critically review some of the literature on trust among 
private parties and between citizens and government, and its implications for tax 
compliance behavior.  Then, I discuss some empirical explorations into untangling the 
complex causal interactions between trust, government, and prosperity. I focus on 
whether trust in public finance can shed light on such longstanding questions such as 
Wagner's law, the effect of government on prosperity, and under what circumstances 
taxpayers act as free riders. 
 
2.  Trust and Trustworthiness among Private Parties 
The notions of trust and the more recently coined term social capital have 
received much recent attention in social science, stimulated in part by the work of  
Putnam (1993) and  Fukuyama (1995), but with antecedents in, for example, Coleman 
(1990).  Economists have recognized the critical role played by trust in economic 
performance.  Arrow (1972) has remarked that “virtually every commercial transaction 
has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of 
time.  It can plausibly be argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world 
can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence.”  In high-trust societies, individuals 
need to spend less resources to protect themselves from being exploited in economic 
                                                           
2 The idea that the structure of the public finances can be instrumental in developing a sense of 
national community has a long history in the United States. Discussing Alexander Hamilton's plans to have 
the U.S. federal government assume the revolutionary debts of the states and combine them into existing 
federal debts, Sandel (1998, p. 134) says, "Fearful that local sentiments would erode national authority and   3
transactions.  Knack and Keefer (1997) argue that trusting societies tend to have stronger 
incentives to innovate and to accumulate both physical and human capital. Lack of trust 
in government may also have costs.  Clague (1993, p. 412) argues that “a society with 
very low levels of rule obedience cannot…have a net of institutions that is conducive to 
economic progress.”   
The idea of reputation--the level of trust one is perceived to merit--has also been 
examined.  As Axelrod (1986) puts it, an individual’s reputation derives from adherence 
to or violation of a norm that others view as a signal about the individual’s future 
behavior in a wide variety of situations.  In Cripps and Thomas (1995), one establishes a 
reputation as others learn, in games with incomplete information, about one’s propensity 
to use a particular strategy.  Such reputation effects are common in multiple-player games 
modeling contributions to public good provision.  For example, Marks and Schansberg 
(1997) find that providing the group with individual-specific information about past 
contributions partially offsets free riding.   
Reputation also matters in interactions between individuals and firms. As 
explained by Campbell (1995), in a market economy, a firm has two sets of rivals: other 
firms and consumers.  Competition with other firms keeps the return to capital low, so a 
firm must do years of business in order to pay off its initial expenditures on capital.  This 
means that its strategy against consumers takes on a time dimension, as the firm relies on 
repeated interactions.  The consumer’s choice to “cooperate with,” or buy from, the firm 
will then depend on whether the firm has “defected,” or been misleading about its 
product, in the past.  A firm’s reputation, then, is simply the record of its past 
performance.  The return to a firm’s reputation comes in the willingness of others to enter 
into future incomplete contracts with the firm.   
The flip side of trust is trustworthiness.  Just as reputation is the ability to elicit 
trust from others, social capital—according to Glaeser et al. (2000)—is the ability to 
elicit trustworthiness from others.  They distinguish between trusting behavior, which 
they define as “the commitment of resources to an activity where the outcome depends 
upon the cooperative behavior of others,” and trustworthy behavior, which “increases the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
doubtful that disinterested virtue could inspire allegiance to the nation, Hamilton saw in public finance an 
instrument of nation-building."   4
returns to people who trust you.”  Glaeser et al. report the results of two experiments.  
The first operationalizes trust and trustworthiness as behavior in the two roles of a trust 
game in which the first player (the “sender,” who is in a position to exhibit trusting 
behavior) is given $15 and can choose how much of that to send to the second player (the 
“recipient,” who is in a position to exhibit trustworthy behavior).  The recipient receives, 
through the experimenters, twice whatever the sender sends, and then can choose how 
much to send back.  In their second experiment, subjects report their willingness to pay 
for an envelope containing $10 that is addressed to them and dropped in different public 
places; this experiment measures only trusting behavior. 
One of their findings has important implications for evaluating much of the 
empirical research I discuss below.  It turns out that the answer that their subjects gave to 
the survey question often used to measure trust in others in empirical studies--“Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful 
in dealing with people?”--correlates with trustworthy, but not with trusting, behavior.  
Moreover, high-status individuals tend to be trusting because their status induces people 
to act in a trustworthy manner toward them, ensuring a high return to trust. They suggest 
that much of the past research on individual behavior based on this and similar “trust” 
questions should therefore be reinterpreted, and conjecture that such questions are best 
used to predict “the overall level of trustworthiness in society.”  The distinction and 
relationship between trust and trustworthiness is important in the empirical analysis 
reported later.  
 
3.  Trust and Government  
3.1  Trust in Government 
What affects the relationship between citizens and the government has a quite 
different flavor than what affects relationships among private parties. The crucial 
difference is not the relative size of the two parties. After all, a consumer dealing with a 
large corporation is in the same relative size position as a citizen is in with respect to 
most federal governments. 
What is unique to government is its role as the sole provider of public and other 
goods and services, its coercive power to collect taxes to pay for these goods and services   5
and, critically, the absence of a link between what the citizen receives from government 
and what he or she pays to government. Firestone Tire Company wants to establish a 
reputation for a high-quality product because consumers need not buy its tires. Citizens, 
however, do not purchase public goods from government the way consumers purchase 
tires; the amount they pay in taxes does not determine the amount or quality of 
government services they receive.  If, as the standard model of taxpayer behavior 
maintains, the perceived quality of government goods does not influence the level of 
taxes remitted, a government does not have a financial incentive to invest in its reputation 
for public goods production, since it will be unable to capture the return to such an 
investment.  (It might, of course, have a political motive to do so.) 
A more apt analogy is with a large charitable organization.  As with government, 
any one person's contribution is a drop in the bucket and will not materially affect the 
organization’s activities.  Of course, unlike government, a charity cannot coerce (other 
than via peer pressure) donations.  However, if one values what use the money is put to, 
then the donor or taxpayer might consider the donation to be a purchase rather than an 
exaction.  
Note that there is at least anecdotal evidence that donors do respond to 
information about the trustworthiness of large charitable organizations.  For example, 
after its national president was charged, and later convicted, of diverting charitable funds 
to his own use, the United Way, the premier fundraising organization in the United 
States, experienced a drop in donors and donations of about 20%.  (Johnston 1997).  
Moreover, there is considerable evidence that consumer purchasing decisions may 
depend on aspects of their perceptions of the producing company that are unrelated to the 
value-for-price tradeoff.  The consumer boycotts of goods produced by Nike is a recent 
example.  Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) discuss evidence that the response to a 
consumer good price increase will be more favorable if people judge the price increase to 
be necessitated by input cost increases rather than the desire for increased profits.   Thus, 
even in the realm of purely private goods, some consumers may override their 
opportunistic impulses and be influenced by their approval of or trust in the producer. 
The distinctive element of the relationship between taxpayer and government is 
the free-rider problem, also known as the zero contribution thesis. Because one’s own   6
outcome is unaffected by one’s own “contribution,” no one should voluntarily contribute 
to a public good--pay taxes--unless the threat of punishment makes it sensible.
3 Thus, 
governments have a political, but not a financial, incentive to invest in their 
trustworthiness, and taxpayers have no incentive to be trustworthy toward the 
government, unless the enforcement regime makes it in their financial interest.
4 
It is undeniable that free riding behavior is ubiquitous.  The story does not, 
though, end there. For example, a vast amount of experimental work (not to say anecdotal 
evidence) suggests that free-riding behavior is context-specific. Ostrom (2000, p. 140) 
remarks that the finding that "the rate of contribution to a public good is affected by 
various contextual factors" is one of seven phenomena that "have been replicated so 
frequently that these can be considered the core facts that theory needs to explain."  The 
challenge, then, is to identify aspects of government expenditure and tax policies that 
mediate the free rider impulse in an empirically important way. 
Although trust in other people and trust in government are not the same thing, 
they may be related. Brehm and Rahn (1997) argue that confidence in government may 
be partly a reflection of the more general relationship of trust in people--if people are 
untrustworthy in general, then people in government are untrustworthy as well. Of 
course, as Brehm (1998) points out, taxpayers may not see people in government as being 
ordinary people, perhaps because they believe that being in government creates 
opportunities for people to exploit others that are not available to ordinary people.  
Furthermore, confidence in government can be a positive force in trusting others, 
in part because government can act as a safeguard for our willingness to extend trust to 
others.  Establishing a fair and efficient legal system is the best example of this, but there 
are others. Fukuyama (1995) stresses the role of government in lowering the personal 
investments and providing the assurances that make possible the trust that lubricates 
cooperation.  On the other hand, some argue that the centralized state undermines 
cooperation and destroys trust among individuals.  Taylor (1982) argues that the 
                                                           
3 The same argument, of course, applies to other decisions such as whether one should anyone expend the 
time and effort to vote. 
4 Note that citizens cannot invest in reputation by being trustworthy towards government.  Tax compliance 
lacks the characteristic—vital to building reputation by signaling trustworthiness—of being observable.  In 
only the rarest cases, after all, is one’s tax evasion made publicly known.   7
centralized state drives out spontaneous coordination that depends on small groups and 
“thick” networks of interaction.  
3.2 Trustworthiness and Reputation of Government 
In a competitive political system such as a democracy, governments face 
incentives to establish good reputations in order to encourage the electorate to select them 
rather than their rivals in the future.  Moreover, to the extent that capital is mobile, 
governments with good reputations for cooperating with business will find that more 
businesses choose their country in the future.  
The role of government reputation and credibility has been extensively examined, 
most often in the context of monetary policy (e.g., Barro and Gordon 1983), but 
reputation has also been used to interpret actors’ responses to other sorts of government 
policies.  For example, Epple (1998) discusses local government reputation with respect 
to whether a town will continue a no-rent-control policy if it is not bound to do so, and 
the choices that property owners make that are dependent on that reputation.  
In these situations, it is in individuals' interest to evaluate whether commitments 
made by the government are credible.  The question on the table is, though, quite 
different--whether trust in government can cause citizens to abandon their short-term 
financial interest of free riding. In this context, Levi (1998) argues that citizens are likely 
to trust government only to the extent that they believe that it will act in their interests, 
that its procedures are fair, and that their trust of the state and others is reciprocated. She 
argues that government trustworthiness, plus the perception that others are doing their 
share, can induce people to become "contingent consenters" who cooperate even when 
their short-term material self interest would make free riding the individual's best option.  
She writes that "the willingness to pay taxes quasi-voluntarily or to give one's contingent 
consent to conscription often rests on the existence of the state's capacity and 
demonstrated readiness to secure the compliance of the otherwise noncompliant." (Levi 
1998, p. 91) 
The operating definitions of trustworthiness of government and trust in 
government that I will adopt are in the spirit of Levi.  Government trustworthiness is all 
those actions that may induce people to forego their opportunistic behavior and become 
contingent compliers.  Trust in government is a belief that the government is carrying out   8
those actions.  The first two aspects of this trust do not depend on the reciprocal actions 
of other citizens, and in these cases trust is close to “approval.”  The third aspect--the 
perception that others are doing their share--is more closely related to the notions of trust 
in others that I have already touched on, because it is about whether people act as if 
others will follow through on what they have promised to do.  Clearly, the survey 
questions on which the empirical investigations that follow rely do not precisely 
correspond to these definitions; they are, though, close enough to be worth examining.  
 
4.  Trustworthiness of Taxpayers: Tax Compliance 
With regard to free rider behavior toward the government, tax compliance poses 
the foremost temptation.  Although officially the U.S. income tax system is based on 
voluntary compliance,
5 in one sense that characterization is purely Orwellian.  An 
elaborate system of employer withholding, matching of information reports, and audits 
with penalties for detected evasion “encourages” compliance.  The fact that, line item by 
line item, there is a clear positive correlation between the so-called voluntary compliance 
rate with the U.S. income tax and the presence of these enforcement mechanisms 
confirms their importance.
6 
Some have argued, however, that the idea of voluntary compliance is not just 
Orwellian Newspeak.  The argument is sometimes loosely based on the observation that, 
given the probability of audit and the penalties typically assessed, evasion seems to be a 
winning proposition for many more people than actually do evade.  For example, Feld 
and Frey (2000, p. 5) assert that it is "impossible to account for tax compliance in terms 
of expected punishment."  From this perspective, the puzzle is not to explain why people 
                                                           
5 The IRS Mission Statement, as cited in Steuerle (1986, p. 1) lists as its first task to "encourage and 
achieve the highest degree of voluntary compliance in accordance with the tax laws and regulations."  IRS 
measures of the level of tax compliance are all couched in this language, featuring concepts such as the 
“voluntary” reporting percentage, and “voluntary” compliance level. 
  Some tax protestors in the United States have used references in court cases to the voluntary 
nature of taxes as a justification for non-payment.  A quotation frequently cited is the following by the U.S. 
Supreme Court:  "Our tax system is based upon voluntary assessment and payment and not upon distraint." 
Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 175. This quotation is taken out of context, and other courts’ 
statements make clear that the opposite is true, such as:  "Any assertion that the payment of income taxes is 
voluntary is without merit.  It is without question that the payment of taxes is not voluntary." United States 
v. Gerads, 999 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir., 1993), per curiam). These quotations are collected in "The Tax 
Protestor FAQ," created by Daniel Evans, http://evans-legal.com/dan/tpfaq.html. 
6 See Klepper and Nagin (1989).   9
evade, but rather why people pay (so much) taxes. Solutions to this puzzle generally 
require pushing beyond the standard economic model, in the context of which people 
who voluntarily comply are exhibiting nothing short of “pathological honesty.”  
I discuss below these attempts to solve the puzzle of apparently voluntary, or 
pathological, compliance.  Before doing so, I must record my objection to the proposition 
that the standard economic model of tax evasion, due to Allingham and Sandmo (1972), 
has been discredited.  The dismissive argument runs along the following lines.  The 
average audit rate in the U.S. is less than 2%.  With that probability of evasion being 
detected, and with the penalty rates in effect, what we know about the degree of risk 
aversion from other contexts suggests that compliance should be much, much lower than 
it apparently is.  The flaw in this argument is that the 2% probability of detection is 
certainly a vast understatement for the bulk of income subject to tax.  A wage or salary 
earner whose employer submits this information electronically to the Internal Revenue 
Service, but who does not report that income on his own personal return, will be flagged 
for further scrutiny with a probability much closer to 100% than to 2%.
7 
Thus, this simple argument for the failure of the utility-maximization approach 
itself fails.  There is, though, some other evidence.  I have already referred to the 
experimental evidence, such as Spicer and Becker (1980) and Alm, Jackson, and McKee 
(1992), in which subjects respond not only to the probabilities and stakes of a tax evasion 
game, but also to context provided to them.  In contrast, Mason and Calvin (1984), in an 
analysis of survey data in Oregon, found that dissatisfaction with the tax system is no 
directly related to reported noncompliance, although it changes other attitudes and 
beliefs.  Cowell (1990, p. 219) reports on other experimental evidence that fails to find 
links between perceived inequities in the tax system and non-compliance.  Kaplan and 
Reckers (1985) found that beliefs about tax morality were more important than beliefs 
about the tax fairness of the tax system. 
Also worthy of note is the ambitious recent attempt of Scholz and Lubell (1998) 
to examine if trust in government affects tax compliance using data from a one-hour in-
person survey supplemented by tax return data.  They have no direct measure of 
                                                           
7 In addition, to the extent that past years' returns may be audited, the relevant probability is the probability 
of audit over a number of years rather than in a single year.   10
noncompliance, but use instead a measure based on answers to twelve questions about 
compliance over a three-year period with specific sources of income, general income, 
deductions, and overall tax reporting.  Their measure of trust in government is the 
summed response to two questions: "You can generally trust the government to do what 
is right," and "Dishonesty in government is pretty rare."  To measure trust in citizens, 
they use the survey answers to "what percentage of taxpayers at your income level...pay 
less taxes than they legally owe."
8 Scholz and Lubell argue that the amount of benefits 
from public activities depends on the amount of taxes collected, which in turn depends on 
the fraction of honest taxpayers, so that greater trust measured in this way should 
correspond to a belief in greater benefits from the collective.  This reasoning requires a 
set of tenuous assumptions, and may be related to noncompliance as a rationalization. 
Scholz and Lubell also control for attitudes about tax fairness and equity, civic 
duty, political efficacy, tax duty, opportunity for evasion, and being in a high non-
compliance occupation.  With these controls, they find that high scores on both trust 
measures significantly decrease the likelihood of noncompliance.  Surprisingly and 
apparently contradictorily, political efficacy  (whether the respondent has a “say” in what 
the government does and whether it is run "mainly for the benefit of special interests") 
increase noncompliance.  The authors rationalize this finding by suggesting that political 
efficacy may lead to a perceived ability to manipulate the system without risk. 
Because of several methodological weaknesses, the Scholz-Lubell study is far 
short of being definitive. Overall, there is no compelling evidence to discard the 
Allingham-Sandmo model of tax compliance, but there are also compelling reasons to 
believe that free riding in other areas is suppressed, and that tax evasion free riding is 
suppressed in experimental situations-- to take seriously that tax compliance does 
respond to taxpayers' attitudes toward government.
9 
                                                           
8 This latter question is obviously much different from the trust question used in most of the other studies 
discussed below. 
9 Victor Hugo, in Les Miserables, observed the following relationship between tax compliance and 
prosperity in 18th Century Paris: 
"When the population suffers, when work is lacking, when there is no commerce, the tax-payer resists 
imposts through penury, he exhausts and oversteps his respite, and the state expends a great deal of money 
in the charges for compelling and collection.  When work is abundant, when the country is rich and happy, 
the taxes are paid easily and cost the state nothing.  It may be said, that there is one infallible thermometer 
of the public misery and riches; the cost of collecting the taxes."  (Penguin Classic edition, p. 171)   11
In their review of tax compliance research, Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) 
identify three classes of explanation for why observed evasion is apparently lower than 
conventional economic models of tax evasion predict: moral rules or sentiments that 
determine the psychic costs of evasion, evaluations of the fairness of the tax code and its 
enforcement, and evaluation of government expenditures and corruption.  Frey (1997) 
links the first two classes of explanation by differentiating between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation.  With intrinsic motivation, taxpayers pay because of “civic virtue;" with 
extrinsic motivation, they do so because of threat of punishment.  Frey argues that 
increasing extrinsic motivation—say with more punitive enforcement policies—“crowds 
out” intrinsic motivation by making people feel that they pay taxes because they have to, 
rather than because they want to.
10 Similarly, in Cullis and Lewis (1997), individuals care 
not only about their own consumption, but also value their own compliance with the 
social convention of tax compliance and separately the extent of others' compliance with 
the norm, either directly or indirectly via pecuniary consequences. Falkinger (1995) 
argues that if tax equity strengthens the social norm against evasion, then evasion 
becomes more costly in terms of bad conscience (if not caught) or bad reputation (if 
caught) in a society with a more equitable system.  Moreover, as Andreoni et al. point 
out, perceived unfairness can be used to rationalize evasion in one’s self-interest, thereby 
decreasing psychic costs.   
In Bordignon (1993) there is a relationship between the individual and the 
government that involves exchange rather than mere coercion.  The taxpayer computes 
the terms of trade between his private consumption and the government provision of 
public goods, and evades (up to his level of risk aversion or up to the level he feels re-
establishes fairness) if he finds these terms unfair.  Unfairness in this model reflects 
either an inadequate level of goods provision with respect to the required tax payment, an 
unfair tax structure, or evasion by other taxpayers.  Andreoni et al. add that an individual 
can also find unfairness in goods provision due to the provision of the wrong goods—i.e., 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Note that this behavior would produce a Wagner's Law phenomenon in which tax collections as a 
fraction of income are higher when income is higher. I am grateful to Jonathan Skinner for bringing this 
quotation to my attention. 
10 Scholz and Lubell (2001), in an experimental setting, find that the level of cooperation in certain settings 
declines significantly when penalties are introduced, suggesting that the increased deterrence motivation 
did not compensate for the change in decision frame brought about by the penalties.   12
someone such as Thoreau may avoid taxes because he thinks government policy wrong.  
But, as Daunton (1998) points out, this is not a simple matter.  Expenditures on warfare 
might be tolerated in a patriotic period but rejected during another period characterized 
by anti-militarism.  Expenditure on welfare might at times be seen as a socially desirable 
pooling of risk, and be seen at other times as a source of national decay. 
Feld and Frey (1999) link all three ideas with what they call a psychological 
contract between the tax authority and citizens, which they believe is the model that 
describes taxation in areas with high levels of direct, rather than merely representative, 
democracy.  They argue that where the relationship between the individual and the tax 
authority is seen as involving an implicit contract sustained by trust, individuals will 
comply due to high “tax morale.”  To sustain citizens’ commitment to the contract and 
therefore their morale, the tax authority must act respectfully toward citizens while at the 
same time protecting the honest from the free rider. It does this by giving taxpayers the 
benefit of the doubt when it finds a mistake, by sanctioning small violations more mildly, 
and by sanctioning large and basic violations (e.g., the failure to file a return) more 
heavily.  In a study of local governments in Switzerland, they find that these policies are 
in fact used more in more direct democracies. 
They claim that such contracts are stronger—and therefore the authority relies on 
the above techniques more heavily—in direct democracies for several reasons.  First, 
citizens in these areas have selected (or at least, Feld and Frey assume, felt comfortable 
with the selection process of) the programs that their taxes support, and therefore should 
feel more willing to pay for them (this assumption falls in line with Andreoni et al.’s third 
idea).  After all, they can express discontent with either tax or spending policy by 
changing the laws, so they don’t need to rely on a violation of the psychological contract.  
Since the authority knows this, it feels justified in treating citizens as trustworthy.   
Of course, an alternative theory could be that in a direct democracy, citizens 
simply choose tax policies that involve respect because they prefer them, rather than that 
there is a psychological contract in place that makes such policies the most efficient way 
of collecting taxes.  However, Feld and Frey’s finding that blatant violations of the tax 
code are punished more heavily in direct democracies does provide some evidence that   13
citizens in more direct democracies are not simply pushing for leniency but rather 
evaluating behavior as upholding or violating a basic contract. 
Whether we call this behavior pathological honesty, or alternatively, good 
citizenship, the fact is that the cost of raising taxes, and of running the government, is 
lower to the extent that taxpayers “volunteer” to comply.  It is as if there is a stock of 
goodwill, or social capital, the return to which is the more efficient operation of 
government. This social capital stock may be reduced by a policy change that decreases 
the incentive to be a law-abiding citizen. 
It is interesting to note that all of the literature about whether attitudes affect 
compliance applies to individual taxpayers, although in most countries the bulk of taxes 
are remitted (as opposed to borne, in the sense of ultimate incidence) by businesses, 
either because the taxes are levied on business entities or because labor income taxes are 
withheld by the employer.  Whether a company’s policy would react as an individual is a 
fascinating and completely open question, one that is related to the motivations behind 
corporate charitable contributions.
11 
  Paying taxes in excess of the remittance that is one's utility-maximizing interest 
can be considered a voluntary contribution to government.
12  There is a more direct way 
to make such contributions--just send money.
13  In the United States, people have always 
been able to do this, but since 1961 Congress has allowed people to earmark 
contributions for reducing the national debt, and has kept records on the amount of 
contributions. Moreover, since 1982 the Internal Revenue Service has included 
instructions in its tax packet on how to make such a contribution.  In the fiscal year 2000, 
these contributions totaled $1.855 million, which amounts to about 0.00001% of federal 
tax collections in that year and about 0.0008% of financial contributions to charities.   
Less than 10% of these gifts are included with federal tax returns.  In fiscal year 1996, 
                                                           
11  See, e.g., Clotfelter (1985). 
12 The tax payments, or lack thereof, of some taxpayers may reflect "pathological dishonesty," if they 
underpay compared to their rational utility-maximizing calculus because of their aversion to government. 
13 Some fraction of purchases of U.S. Savings Bonds might be considered to be a contribution to the 
government, to the extent that the return-for-risk is lower than a non-government alternative, and this is 
known to the purchaser.   14
366 Americans slipped checks totaling just $85,378 to reduce the federal debt inside their 
tax returns.
14 
  Slemrod and Oltmans (2000) investigates the aggregate annual amount of such 
gifts since 1961, to see if their magnitude is systematically related to attitudes toward 
government or objective measures of government expenditure patterns, tax structure, and 
the deficit.  They do discover such relationships.  For example, gifts to government are 
higher in years when the national debt is higher, suggesting a need-driven motive for 
gifts.  Perhaps surprisingly, gifts are higher when the proportion of the population who 
endorse the belief that government wastes taxes is higher. This is consistent with donors 
embracing the earmarked nature of the gift--to a good use, reducing the debt, rather than 
a bad use, wasteful government spending. More generally, the systematic nature of these 
gifts is consistent with the notion that the gifts implicit in extraordinary tax compliance 
levels may also be related to attitudes and objective measures of government expenditure, 
taxation, and deficit policies.  
 
6.  Previous Literature on the Relationship between Trust, Government and 
Prosperity 
It is one thing to hypothesize about the role of trust in government in taxpaying 
behavior and the efficient operation of an economy.  It is quite another, and more 
demanding, task to identify its role empirically.  This section briefly reviews some of the 
existing literature related to that task, while the next section presents research that 
extends our empirical knowledge of the inter-relationship within and, mostly, across 
countries.  
 
6.1 Evidence on the Determinants of Taxation and Government Spending 
Trust and social capital may provide a clue to explaining one of the most striking 
empirical regularities in public finance -- the positive association between a country’s 
                                                           
14 There are also fascinating localized examples of gifts to government.  For example, in 2000 the state of 
Pennsylvania mailed out 2.5 million income tax rebates to its taxpayers; the rebate was prompted by a large 
budget surplus, and was described as an offset to local property taxes.  The Associated Press (2000) reports 
that hundreds of these checks have been signed over to local school districts.  One donor was quotes as 
saying that "it's important that schools have more money to meet their needs."   15
tax-to-GDP ratio and its level of affluence, as measured for example by its per capita 
GDP. Two classes of explanation have been offered to explain this association.
15 
The first, called Wagner’s Law, is a demand explanation.  It posits that rising incomes 
and associated structural changes (such as urbanization) engender a demand for more 
government involvement.  Another explanation is that affluence is associated with 
demographic characteristics (such as literacy and less reliance on agriculture) that 
facilitate raising tax revenue, which in turn leads to expanded government activity.  Of 
course, these explanations are not mutually exclusive, and the research challenge, as in 
many settings, is to disentangle the supply and demand explanations for government 
expenditure and taxation.
16 
  Professor Musgrave, in his 1969 book Fiscal Systems, noted the high positive 
correlation, both across countries and over time, between GDP per capita and the total tax 
ratio, as did Richard Goode (1968).  Goode suggests that rather than income being the 
driving factor, this correlation may result from the positive correlation between per capita 
income and other social and economic conditions that make direct taxes acceptable and 
effective, such as a high level of literacy, wide use of standard accounting methods, 
effective public administration, and political stability.  Musgrave himself noted that the 
relationship between income and the tax ratio is solely a result of comparing low and 
high-income groups of countries, and did not hold within each group of countries. More 
recently, Tanzi (1992) investigates the determinants of the share of tax in GDP in 83 
developing countries during the period 1978-1988.  He finds that, by itself, the log of per 
capita income is positively associated with the tax ratio, but the share of agricultural 
output in GDP (highly negatively correlated with per capita GDP) explains more of the 
variation in tax shares than does per capita income and has a negative sign.  When both 
variables are included, per capita income no longer has a significant positive effect, 
although the negative effect of the agricultural share survives.  
 
6.2 Evidence on the Effect of Trust (and Government) on Prosperity 
6.2.1 Trust 
                                                           
15 By the way, the same relationship holds for most countries over time: the tax-GDP ratio has grown as the 
country has become richer. 
16 See Slemrod (1995) for the problems involved in this enterprise.   16
There is some empirical evidence that trust and civic duty among a country’s 
citizens contribute to growth.
17  Knack and Keefer (1997) tested the impact of these 
attitudes on both growth and investment rates in a cross-section of 29 countries, using 
measures of trust and civic norms from the World Values Surveys of 1981 and 1990. To 
assess the level of trust in others in a society, they use the WVS question investigated 
above. The strength of norms of civic cooperation was assessed from attitudes toward 
five particular actions, including the tax evasion question used here already.   
Knack and Keefer find that social capital variables exhibit a strong and significant 
positive relationship to economic growth.  As they note, the causality of this relationship 
could go in either direction: trust could be a product of optimism generated by high or 
growing incomes, or it could be that trust facilitates prosperity.  However, they find that 
trust is more correlated with per capita income in later years than with income in earlier 
years, suggesting that the causation runs from trust to growth more so than vice versa. 
One possible channel through which trust might affect economic outcomes is its 
impact on the performance of government.  To investigate this, Knack and Keefer 
construct an index of how much confidence people profess in various governmental and 
societal institutions and find that, controlling for per capita income and education 
enrollments, the only significant determinant of government performance is the trust 
variable: a trusting citizenry facilitates a successful government.  It is, though, 
conceivable that the causation is reversed -- that it is the behavior of governments that 
influences levels of trust.  
Zak and Knack (2001) extend the Knack and Keefer framework by separately 
testing for the effect on growth of proxies for the presence of formal institutions, social 
distance, and discrimination and for whether their effect remains significantly correlated 
with growth controlling for measures of trust.  They find that trust is positively and 
significantly related to growth even in the presence of measures of formal institutions or 
of social distance, but that most of the influence of the latter on growth occurs through 
their impact on trust. The one exception is a measure of property rights, which retains its 
independent positive association with growth even in the presence of a trust variable. 
                                                           
17 There is also an older literature of cross-country research on national development that argued that 
nations whose people generally support government policies progress more rapidly than nations in which 
obedience must be coerced.  See Almond and Verba (1963).   17
They justify this finding by noting that this index includes government actions against 
private agents.  In contrast, the trust measure is “likely to be little affected by perceptions 
of the trustworthiness of government…” (p. 316) 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silvanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) find that, across 
countries, a one-standard deviation increase in the measure of trust increases judicial 
efficiency by 0.7 of a standard deviation and reduced government corruption by 0.3 of a 
standard deviation.  Putnam (1993) examines cross-regional Italian data and concludes 
that local governments are more efficient where there is greater civic engagement. 
6.2.2 Government 
  In recent years there has been an explosion of cross-country studies of the impact 
of government taxation and expenditure on prosperity. In contrast to the literature on the 
determinants of the size of government discussed above, and to the new analyses 
presented later, the prosperity indicator in all these studies is a measure not of the level of 
prosperity, but rather of its rate of growth 
  In the most influential of these studies, Barro (1991a) examines a cross-section of 
98 countries for the period 1960-1985 and, among other concerns, investigates the 
impacts on economic growth of government expenditures, measured as the ratio to real 
GDP of real government consumption purchases less spending on education and defense.  
He finds a significantly negative association of this government expenditure variable, 
averaged over the period 1970-1985, with real growth from 1960 to 1985.  Barro suggests 
that one interpretation of these findings is that government consumption introduces 
distortions, such as high tax rates, but does not provide an offsetting stimulus to 
investment and growth. 
  Several subsequent studies, most notably Levine and Renelt (1992) and Easterly 
and Rebelo (1993) have, however, demonstrated that this negative association is by no 
means robust to reasonable alternative formulations. Easterly and Rebelo (1993), using 
several different measures of fiscal policy, find that measures of the level of taxes tend to 
be insignificant in Barro-style growth rate regressions. They ascribe this finding to the 
strong positive correlation between their fiscal variables and the initial (1960) level of per 
capita income, making it difficult to disentangle the effects of fiscal variables from those 
of the initial level of income--the “convergence” effect discussed in Barro and Sala-i-  18
Martin (1992) and elsewhere.  Slemrod (1995) reviews this literature and concludes that 
it has not resolved many of the problems with interpreting the estimated coefficient of a 
G variable in a growth equation.  
 
7.  New Evidence on the Structural Relationship Among Trust, Government and 
Prosperity 
Although there is a growing and, in some cases, large empirical literature on the 
determinants of growth, size of government, and aspects of trust and trustworthiness, it is 
fair to say that no empirical analysis has attempted to untangle the structural relationships 
among them.  This section begins that task.  As is inevitable for a first step, it leaves 
many open questions.  Nevertheless, it is promising in that the data analysis is supportive 
of several of the hypotheses raised earlier in this paper.    
  
7.1 Data 
The data on trust and trustworthiness come from the 1990 wave of the World Values 
Survey (WVS), the purpose of which is to facilitate cross-national comparisons of values, 
norms, and attitudes.  The survey was conducted, with limited national modifications, in 
45 countries.  It asked about attitudes concerning work, family, religion, politics, and 
contemporary social issues and gathered a limited amount of demographic data as well.  
The 25 capitalist countries in the survey for which sufficient other data are available 
make up my sample.
18  Although the data are subject to the usual reservations about 
attitude surveys, and in particular cross-country attitude surveys, the data has been widely 
and fruitfully used by political scientists and sociologists, not to mention Knack and 
Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001); for an extensive, albeit incomplete, list of its 
use in research, see Inglehart, Basanez, and Moreno (1998). 
Along with other variables that are used in the analysis (for a description, see the 
Data Appendix), I will use three WVS variables as indicators of trust and trustworthiness.  
These come from the following questions: 
 
                                                           
18 The countries are Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, (West) 
Germany, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, (Republic of) Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.   19
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t 
be too careful in dealing with people? 
 
Please tell me whether you think that lying in your own interest can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between. (scale from 1=never justified to 
10=always justified)   
 
Please tell me whether you think that cheating on tax if you have the chance can 
always be justified, never be justified, or something in between. (scale from 1=never 
justified to 10=always justified) 
 
 
The weighted mean values are used as country-level measures of trust in others, (lack of) 
trustworthiness, and acceptability of tax evasion, respectively.
19 The responses are re-
scaled to lie in a 0 to 100 range. 
 
7.2  Correlations, Without Causation 
As background for the empirical exercises, Tables 1 and 2 present correlation 
matrices.  (Summary statistics are presented in Tables 4 and 5). Table 1 refers to within-
country responses for the United States and West Germany. Among respondents from 
each country, trust in others is positively associated with both financial satisfaction and 
income.  The story is slightly different for tax evasion as a measure of trustworthiness.  
The acceptability of tax evasion falls with financial satisfaction in both countries, but 
increase with income in Germany and, although not with statistical significance, in the 
United States.  Trustworthiness as measured by refraining from lying is also positively 
correlated with financial satisfaction, but negatively associated with income. This 
suggests that the attractiveness of opportunistic behavior follows a "satisficing" pattern: 
people of any income who are satisfied with their lot are more likely to abstain from this 
kind of behavior. 
There is also generally a clear positive association between trust in others and the 
two measures of trustworthiness. By far the highest correlation is between the two 
measures of trustworthiness (“is lying ok” and “is tax evasion ok?”), suggesting that 
whatever mechanism inculcates these norms affects both one's behavior towards people 
                                                           
19 I also ran the same set of models using unweighted country means from the World Values Survey data. 
The results are very similar both qualitatively and quantitatively to those reported here. 
   20
for whom establishing a reputation may have a payoff and one's behavior toward the 
government, for which it is unlikely to have a payoff in the private sector. However, in 
both countries those who trust or have confidence in government are less likely to find 
tax evasion acceptable.
20 
In both countries more educated people are more likely to trust others, but are also 
more likely to find lying and, in Germany only, tax evasion to be acceptable. They 
exhibit less confidence in government.  Religious people are on average both more 
trusting and, particularly, more trustworthy.  Those on the right of the political spectrum 
have less trust in others in the U.S. but not significantly in Germany and, perhaps 
surprisingly, have more trust in government in the U.S..  In the U.S., those with a right-
wing political orientation are neither more nor less trustworthy on average to a significant 
degree; they are clearly more trustworthy in Germany. 
The positive correlation in the U.S. between trust in others and trust in 
government is consistent with the finding of Brehm (1998), who argues based on the 
1996 National Election Survey data from the United States that there is a strong positive 
relationship between social trust and government trust.  However, Newton (1999) shows 
that the positive correlation between trust in others and trust in government is not a 
general result.  He finds that among 12 countries in the 1990 World Values Survey that 
have both questions, the correlation between trust in government and trust in others is 
small and a negative .03.  Newton concludes that political trust is not caused so much by 
social or economic factors as by political ones, including the record and orientation of the 
party in power; for example, right-leaning people will be more likely to express distrust 
when the left is in power. Newton (1999) does, though, find that the positive correlation 
of social trust with satisfaction with life, age, religiosity, income, and education level is 
quite robust across seven developed countries.  
Table 2 is a weighted correlation matrix of the country means of the measures of 
trust, the measures of trustworthiness, and other country-specific indicators.  Because the 
number of observations is so much lower, the significance levels are on average much 
                                                           
20 The trust in government question (“How much do you trust the government in [national capital] to do 
what is right?”) was asked in only 7 of the 25 sample countries, so it is unfortunately not used in the 
analysis that follows.   21
lower compared to the within-country correlations of Table 1, although the correlations 
themselves are often much higher in absolute value.  
Across countries trust in others is still strongly a phenomenon of affluence. 
However, the relationship between financial satisfaction and evasion flips sign in the 
cross-country context.  While within the U.S. and Germany those who profess to be more 
financially satisfied are less likely to condone evasion, across countries more financial 
satisfaction is positively correlated with condoning evasion.   Across countries, the 
correlation between trust in others and the acceptability of evasion reverses sign and 
become positive, although the statistical significance is not strong.
 It is also true that 
across countries the relationship between either religion or political orientation changes 
notably.  Although within the U.S., religious people are both more trusting and 
trustworthy, across countries the opposite is true for trust in others, and no clear 
relationship exists for the other measures.  
  For later purposes, one further set of correlations is worth noting.  In countries 
with a high level of government involvement, people are more likely to find tax evasion 
to be acceptable, even though their residents are not notably less trustworthy generally (as 
measured by their response to the question about the acceptability of lying in one's own 
interest), and are significantly more trusting of others. In fact, the highest absolute 
correlants with evasion attitudes, other than the other measure of trustworthiness, are 
measures of the country's level of government. 
7.3 A Structural Model 
7.3.1 Tax Cheating and Size of Government 
I begin by investigating a model of the extent of tax cheating and the size of 
government that recognizes the interdependence of the two. In what follows I use G to 
denote the extent of government involvement in the economy, TC to denote attitudes 
toward tax cheating, TW to denote trustworthiness, and TO to stand for trust in others.    
Finally, Y will denote a measure of prosperity, measured by the log of GDP per capita. 
The two structural relationships are summarized as follows:  
 
(1)  TC=TC(G, TW, ZTC) 
(2)  G=G(Y, TC, ZG)   22
 
  Equation (1) refers to the determination of attitudes toward tax cheating.  It is 
presumed to depend on the degree of overall trustworthiness in the society, assumed to be 
exogenous in this analysis, and on the extent of government involvement and the tax 
burden. The only other exogenous variable is the average age of the survey respondents.
21  
In other studies, age has been found to be negatively associated with the propensity to 
evade taxes.  
 Equation (2) represents the determination of the extent of government 
involvement in a country.  This may depend, via Wagner's Law, on the level of 
prosperity. I hypothesize that it also depends on the extent to which people are willing to 
suspend their free-rider impulses and forego tax cheating opportunities; the more people 
do so, the lower is the cost of raising resources for government, and the larger 
government will be. Included in the vector of explanatory variables, ZG, are standard 
indicators of either the demand for or cost of providing government services. In 
particular, ZG includes the age dependency ratio, the percentage of the economy that is 
agricultural, the extent of illiteracy, and the extent of openness.  Some of these variables 
may affect the size of government both via the cost of raising revenue and the demand for 
government services, so that the interpretation of these variables’ coefficients is 
problematic.  Finally, in ZG is a dummy variable for whether the country’s legal system 
is of either English, Scandinavian, or German (but not French) origin.  Following La 
Porta, et al (1999) this variable may represent a historical tradition of limiting 
government power.  
  The results of estimating this system using three-stage least squares
22 are shown 
as Model 1 of Table 3. The equation explaining attitudes toward tax cheating is crisp and 
reasonable.  It says that tax cheating is lower in countries that exhibit more (not-
government-related) trustworthiness.  However, holding that constant, tax cheating 
                                                           
21 Holding trustworthiness constant, elderly people may have different attitudes toward evasion because 
they may have less direct involvement with the income tax system. 
22 Joint significance tests on the slope coefficients in each of the first-stage instrumenting regressions were 
carried out in each of the three models considered. After adjusting the estimated variance matrices by the 
White heteroscedasticity correction, each of the tests displays significance at a 1% level, except for the 
equations for G and G-squared in Model 3, which are significant at a 5% level. 
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becomes more acceptable as government grows, to a significant and larger degree. An 
older population reduces the average acceptability of tax evasion.  
  The second column of Model 1 shows the results of estimating a structural 
equation explaining the level of government. There is clear evidence of a Wagner’s Law 
relationship, as evidenced by the significant and large coefficient on the log level of 
income. Holding income (and the ZG variables) constant, though, a more accepting 
attitude toward tax cheating does limit the size of government.  True, the estimated 
relationship does not reach standard levels of statistical significance. Nevertheless, there 
is some weak evidence that the strong positive correlation between the size of 
government and tax cheating masks the fact that big government induces tax cheating 
while, at the same time, tax cheating constrains big government.  Certainly, more 
research is needed to clarify this structure. 
  Among the exogenous variables, the openness measure is significantly positive, 
corroborating the findings of Rodrik (1998) and Cameron (1978) before him. The 
illiteracy variable is also positive, suggesting that it serves more as a measure of the 
demand for social services than as a measure of the difficulty of raising revenue.  Neither 
the age dependency variable nor the agriculture variable is significant.  The legal system 
dummy variable does enter as hypothesized, in that an English, German or Scandinavian 
system of law is associated, although not significantly at conventional levels, with 
smaller governments than otherwise.   
  
7.3.2 Tax Cheating, Size of Government, and Prosperity 
 I next expand the ambitiousness of this exercise by adding to the structural model 
an equation determining the level of prosperity, equation (3) below.  In its structural 
equation, I allow prosperity to depend on the level of government (and the level squared, 
to allow that the marginal impact can change sign at a certain level), on trust in others (as 
emphasized by Knack and Keefer (1997) and others), and a short vector of exogenous 
variables.  The two exogenous variables measure the physical capital stock (specifically 
the capital-labor ratio) and the human capital stock (measured by the level of illiteracy).   24
Together with the trust in others variable, a measure of social capital, equation (3) posits 
that prosperity depends on four kinds of capital—physical, human, social, and public.
23   
  The system now becomes: 
 
(1)  TC=TC(G, TW, ZTC) 
(2) G=G(Y, TC, ZG) 
(3) Y=Y(G, G
2, TO, ZY) 
 
Model 2 of Table 3 describes the results of the three-stage-least squares 
estimation of this system of three equations. The estimated equation for income is quite 
reasonable.  More physical capital and more human capital significantly increase real 
income per capita.  So does more trust in others, although the coefficient only barely 
exceeds its estimated standard error. To put the magnitudes in perspective, a one standard 
deviation increase in trust in others is associated with a 5.5% higher level of per capita 
income. The pattern of influence of government on prosperity takes the form suggested 
by Barro (1991a): its marginal effect is positive until a turning point is reached.  The 
turning point is estimated to be at a government that represents 37.9% of GDP. Note, 
though, that the t-statistics are only slightly above one.
24  
One consequence of expanding the system to three equations is that, compared to 
Model 1, the coefficient on tax cheating in the size of government equation essentially 
goes to zero, and the absolute size and significance of the other variables declines, 
although the qualitative results are unchanged. 
Finally, in Model 3 I show the results of replicating Model 2, but replacing the 
survey measure of trust with the survey measure of trustworthiness as a determinant of 
prosperity. According to this specification, trustworthiness cannot explain variations in 
prosperity as well as variations in trust can.  However, this change sharpens the evidence 
for most of the other hypotheses I am concerned with.  In particular, the negative 
coefficient of tax cheating on the size of government is restored, and the first-positive, 
                                                           
23 Lack of data does not allow also including a measure of natural resources, or capital. 
24 Joint tests were performed on G and G-squared in Models 2 and 3 to test the hypothesis that government 
spending affects prosperity. In both tests the chi-squared statistic with 2 degrees of freedom fails to reach 
standard levels of significance.   25
then-negative effect of government on prosperity becomes more statistically significant 
(with a turning point of 31.5%).  This illustrates the fragility of at least some of the 
conclusions that can be drawn from these exercises. 
7.4  Is It All Just Well-Tossed Spaghetti?  
Even without considering trust in government, Robert Putnam despaired that "the 
causal arrows among civic involvement, reciprocity, honesty, and social trust are as 
tangled as well-tossed spaghetti." (2000, p. 137)
25  Clearly there are plausible stories that, 
of trust, trustworthiness, attitudes toward tax evasion, size of government, and prosperity, 
almost any variable has a direct effect on almost any other variable.  Of course, to an 
econometrician, a bowl of spaghetti-like causal arrows raises issues of simultaneity bias, 
which require defensible “exclusion restrictions” to assert that the estimated coefficient 
reflect true causal, structural effects. The specifications I have investigated in this paper 
are based on a careful reading of the existing literature and introspection about, to put it 
directly, what affects what.  In the process of this research I have learned that many of the 
findings are not robust to alternative, reasonable, specifications.  Some are apparently 
more robust than others, as I suggest below.  Nor have I even waded into the issues of 
data reliability, which are serious issues both with respect to the survey-based measures 
of trust and trustworthiness, but also to the measure of government size and other 
variables. Nevertheless, I believe that empirical analysis that simply ignores the 
interrelationships may be seriously misleading and an important research challenge is to 
try to untangle the well-tossed spaghetti. I summarize the insights from this exercise 
below.   
I find some evidence that both prosperity and government involvement are higher 
in more trusting societies.  Moreover, holding these measures of trust constant, the 
association of government size with prosperity is positive until a level of government 
spending somewhere between 31.5% and 37.9% of GDP, after which its marginal effect 
is negative.   
  There is a caveat to this neat story, however.  In countries with bigger 
governments, there is a breakdown in the trustworthiness its citizens exhibit toward 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
25 In a similar vein, Messere (1993) characterizes as “fishing expeditions” efforts to relate tax levels and 
structure to measures of economic performance.   26
government, as measured by the acceptability of tax evasion.  Thus, although a trusting 
citizenry allows larger government, the tax burden this entails erodes the rule obedience 
taxpayers exhibit toward government.  Whether this is the reason that at some high level 
further government is associated with less prosperity is an intriguing, but still open, 
question. 
 
8  Conclusion: Trust in Public Finance 
Not surprisingly, these empirical exercises have uncovered neither the elixir of 
prosperity, nor the key to establishing trust among all mankind.  Nor have they 
established that considering trust, social capital, and community constructs the conceptual 
bridge between government expenditure and taxation that Professor Musgrave despaired 
that the profession was overlooking. 
Even if it were clear that taxpaying behavior depended on attitudes toward 
government, the policy implications are not clear.  To be sure, these attitudes cannot be 
easily changed.  Blumenthal, Christian, and Slemrod (2001) reports on the results of a 
field experiment in which Minnesota taxpayers were sent one of two letters, one that 
detailed the good things that taxes supported (without invoking the free-rider problem), 
and the other reporting the high rate of aggregate taxpayer compliance (playing down the 
“sucker” syndrome).  Taxpayers who received either letter exhibited no significant 
increase in income tax compliance compared to a control group of taxpayers that did not 
receive either letter.  Apparently one-shot exhortations are not successful, a result that 
wouldn’t surprise many who are familiar with the marketing literature on this subject.
26 
One fascinating area for future research is whether our models of the behavioral 
response to the tax system fail when the free-rider assumption fails. To put the question 
starkly, can social capital explain why people continue to work, save and invest in the 
face of the high marginal tax rates in many countries?  When social security benefits are 
tied to payroll tax payments via a formula, economists (e.g., Feldstein and Samwick 
(1992)) have questioned whether the incentive effects need to be adjusted for the 
marginal benefits that accrue. More generally, if for most taxpayers their tax payments 
                                                           
26 There is, though, a school of marketing science experts who argue that one-shot advertising is nearly as 
effective as multiple communications.    27
are the optimal Allingham-Sandmo payment plus a “gift” to government, will they 
respond to taxes as our standard model suggests? 
I don’t know the answer to this question, but I do know that is one aspect of a 
fundamental methodological question: is the positive theory of taxation a straightforward 
application of price theory, or is it something quite different?  Consider the tax-
augmented relative price term that applies to a commodity in an individual’s budget set, 
p*(1+t), where the “t” is the tax wedge inserted by a consumption tax or an income tax 
(in the latter case the relative price is usually written as w*(1-t), where w is the wage 
rate).  Using this notation, the methodological question is whether individuals respond to 
the relative price p*(1+t), or whether the response to the “p” part and the “(1+t)” part are 
systematically different.  In the standard model they are not. 
I have argued elsewhere (Slemrod, 2001) that because of avoidance and evasion, 
the response to p and the response to (1+t) will be different.  The idea is that a change in t 
changes the return-risk tradeoff of avoidance and evasion in ways that changes in p do 
not, and the former involves the tax avoidance technology and not only taxpayer 
preferences.  The ideas explored in this paper suggest another reason why the two 
responses may be systematically different.
27  Taxpayers’ attitudes toward government 
affect how they react to (1+t), but not to p.  
I am sure that Professor Musgrave would agree that public finance is much, much 
more than applied price theory.  Indeed, he has written that his fascination with the field 
is "rooted in its broad scope, a joining of economics, politics, and social ethics," and that 
"the existence of externalities and the need to confront the issues of distribution enrich 
social life, the challenge of freedom and with it the human status of its members" 
(Buchanan and Musgrave, p. 29 and 49).  No one has more eloquently stated the task 
before scholars of the public sector. 
 
                                                           
27 Rosen (1976) and Konig, et al (1995) explore yet another reason, that taxpayers are unaware of their tax 
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